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Abstract Screening for unsuspected disease has both possible beneﬁts and harms
for those who participate. Historically the beneﬁts of participation have been
emphasized to maximize uptake reﬂecting a public health approach to policy;
currently policy is moving towards an informed choice approach involving giving
information about both beneﬁts and harms of participation. However, no research
has been conducted to evaluate the impact on health of an informed choice policy.
Using psychological models, the ﬁrst aim of this study was to describe an
explanatory framework for variation in screening uptake and to apply this frame-
work to assess the impact of informed choices in screening. The second aim was to
evaluate ethically that impact. Data from a general population survey (n = 300) of
beliefs and attitudes towards participation in diabetes screening indicated that
greater orientation to the present is associated with greater social deprivation and
lower expectation of participation in screening. The results inform an explanatory
framework of social patterning of screening in which greater orientation to the
present focuses attention on the disadvantages of screening, which tend to be
immediate, thereby reducing participation. This framework suggests that an in-
formed choice policy, by increasing the salience of possible harms of screening,
might reduce uptake of screening more in those who are more deprived and ori-
entated to the present. This possibility gives rise to an apparent dilemma where an
ethical decision must be made between greater choice and avoiding health
inequality. Philosophical perspectives on choice and inequality are used to point to
some of the complexities in assessing whether there really is such a dilemma and if
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DOI 10.1007/s10728-007-0056-6so how it should be resolved. The paper concludes with a discussion of the ethics of
paternalism.
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Introduction
Approaches to Screening
A major component of current public health strategy is the provision of
screening programmes to allow prevention and early treatment of serious disease.
A characteristic of screening is that it involves the possibility of immediate harm
in return for the possibility of future beneﬁt. For example breast screening with
mammography has a number of substantial possible immediate harms [26, 38,
50]. In 2001 ﬁve percent of mammography screens in the US gave a false
positive result leading to further testing [53]. Even when further tests result in a
diagnosis of breast cancer, about 20 percent of the cases identiﬁed will be of
ductal carcinoma in situ which has an uncertain course without treatment [50].
Many such cancers are not life threatening but, once detected, are usually treated
as such [53]. Such treatments are unpleasant and damaging to health and women
diagnosed with ductal carcinoma in situ have similar anxiety levels to those with
early invasive breast cancer [39]. In contrast, only a small number of people,
relative to the total screened, have their lives saved, even over a considerable
period of time. Estimates suggest that 2451 women aged between 50 and 59
need to be screened as recommended over a ﬁve-year period to save one life
[41].
Because only a few cases of disease will be detected within a healthy population,
large numbers need to be screened in order to have an impact on overall population
health. Thus high uptake of screening has been encouraged by emphasizing the
beneﬁts of participation, reﬂecting a public health approach to screening [27].
Recently, in the UK, there has been a policy change towards promoting informed
choices particularly in screening:
There is a responsibility to ensure that those who accept an invitation [to
screening] do so on the basis of an informed choice, and appreciate that in
accepting an invitation or participating in a programme to reduce their risk of
a disease there is a risk of an adverse outcome [32].
One of the factors inﬂuencing the move to informed choices has been a concern
about patient autonomy [16]. The issue of autonomy has become more salient with
the rise of ‘patient-centred medicine’ in reaction to concerns with traditional
medical practice and its emphasis on the role of the health professional in medical
decision-making. [37]
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Informed choices have been deﬁned as those based on relevant knowledge,
consistent with the decision-maker’s values and behaviourally implemented [28].
To make an informed choice participants need information about their personal risks
of developing the condition, what having the screening test will be like, accuracy of
the test, and what will happen if the screening test is positive [15]. While the place
of this information in facilitating informed choices is obvious, the role of values
may be less so. People will, however, attach different values to the possible
outcomes of screening. For example those who are more and less socially deprived
may place a different value on early diagnosis. The consequences of being
diagnosed with a serious condition can have very different implications for those
who have material resources and those who don’t, even within a universal
healthcare system. While those who have a high level of material resources can use
those resources to ameliorate the impact of a diagnosis of serious illness, for those
who are more socially deprived such a diagnosis may bring the prospect of
increasing poverty and uncertainty and they might thus prefer to delay knowledge of
an illness for as long as possible [24].
There has been no research to describe or evaluate the impact of an informed
choice policy in screening. One possible impact is that it will reduce uptake of the
screening programme with a greater reduction in some groups, for example those
who are more socially deprived and already have lower participation in screening.
Such a decline in the uptake of screening could be evaluated negatively as
contributing to a decline in the overall health of the population or positively as
reﬂecting an increase in the autonomy of the individual. This paper seeks to describe
and evaluate the possible impact of an informed choice policy in screening.
Explaining Screening Uptake
Uptake of screening is lowest in those who are most socially deprived. This is a
consistent ﬁnding across different screening programmes and healthcare systems
[20, 29, 48]. Lower uptake among the most socially deprived is, at least in part, a
consequence of a lack of material resources, such as transport costs to the screening
centre. But when the lack of such resources is controlled for in statistical analyses,
differences in uptake remain [23]. Psychological characteristics, among other
factors, contribute to explaining those differences [48, 52].
One such psychological characteristic might be time orientation. Psychologists
suggest that people use information about the timeframe in which an event occurs to
process information about the event and to make decisions. However, people’s
responses to the speciﬁc timeframe in which an event might occur, vary. Individuals
have preferences for certain timeframes which inﬂuence their information
processing and evaluation of actions and the possible outcomes of those actions.
These preferences are called time orientation.
While a number of different time orientations have been identiﬁed [55], evidence
for their existence is strongest for two of these, future and present orientation. Those
who have high future orientation think more about the future and have an awareness
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future orientation [42]. Future orientation is associated with the practice of health-
related behaviours, such as physical activity and healthy eating, that might involve
immediate cost for possible future gain [22, 25, 34, 42]. Those who have high present
orientation think more about immediate outcomes of their behaviour than those who
are less present orientated [42]. High present orientation is also associated with a
limited sense of control and fatalism about life events [42] and unhealthy behaviours,
such as substance abuse, which result in immediate rather than future rewards
[18, 42]. Future and present orientation are largely independent, of one another with
each being associated with different patterns of thought and behaviour [18, 56].
Because the possible harms of screening are immediate while the possible
beneﬁts occur in the future, time orientation may contribute to explaining screening
uptake. Increasing information about the possible harms and limited beneﬁts of
screening may therefore have a differential impact on those with different time
orientations. Given that time orientation and social deprivation are associated
[33, 47], this effect may vary by social deprivation.
Aims
The ﬁrst aim of this study is to describe the possible impact of an informed choice
policy on screening uptake by exploring the relationships between social
deprivation, present orientation and expectations of participation in screening.
The second aim is to evaluate that impact from different ethical perspectives.
Method
Design
A questionnaire-based descriptive survey.
Sample
A total of 300 participants was recruited. The sample was structured to reﬂect the
English population in terms of age and sex with one third of the sample being drawn
from each of the North, South and Midlands of England.
Procedure
Home-based interviews were conducted by a research agency. Questionnaires were
completed by interviewers on behalf of participants.
Materials
In the ﬁrst part of the interview information about diabetes screening, based on that
used in previous research [34], was presented to participants (Appendix 1), after
which the following measures were completed:
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measuring intention to participate in screening was assessed on ﬁve-point
response scales [34, 35] giving a measure with good reliability (Cronbach’s
alpha: .85).
2. Time orientation. A brief, nine item version of the Stanford Time Perspective
Inventory (Crockett et al. in submission). The Stanford Time Perspective
Inventory (STPI) has been extensively validated and used in the study of health
behaviour [9, 21, 42, 56]. This brief STPI consists of nine items, measured on
ﬁve-point rating scales, comprising two subscales with adequate reliability: ﬁve
items measuring future orientation (Cronbach’s alpha: .67) and four items
measuring present orientation (Cronbach’s alpha: .62).
3. Social deprivation: A brief three item measure asking participants to indicate:
i. Possession of educational qualiﬁcations
ii. Home ownership (including having a mortgage).
Those who neither owned their homes nor had any educational qualiﬁcations
were considered to have the greatest social deprivation (scored as 2); those who
either owned their homes or had educational qualiﬁcations were considered to have
intermediate levels of social deprivation (scored as 1); and, those who both owned
their homes and had educational qualiﬁcations were considered to have the least
social deprivation (scored as 0). This measure was derived from our previous
research which indicated that individual level measures of social deprivation
showed greater associations with psychological characteristics than did neighbour-
hood measures such as the Indices of Multiple Deprivation (Crockett et al. in
preparation).
Analysis
Statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS version 12. Associations between
social deprivation, future and present time orientation and expectations of
participation in diabetes screening were examined using Spearman’s rank corre-
lations.
Results
The associations between social deprivation, time orientation and expectations of
participation in diabetes screening are shown in Table 1.
Future orientation was not signiﬁcantly associated with social deprivation
(r = .067, n = 300, P = .247) or with expectations of participation in screening
(r = .054, n = 300, P = .349). However present orientation was signiﬁcantly
associated with both social deprivation (r = .245, n = 300, P < 0.001) and
expectations of participation in screening (r = .265, n = 300, P < 0.001).
Because only present orientation showed associations with social deprivation and
expectations of participation in screening, further ﬁndings are presented for present
orientation only. To illustrate the association between social deprivation, uptake of
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mean expectation of participation in diabetes screening at each level of deprivation.
As social deprivation increases, expectations of participation decrease. A one-point
difference between those most and those least deprived indicates a substantial effect
of social deprivation on expectations of participation in screening. Figure 1(b)
shows the mean expectation of participation between those with high and low levels
of present orientation, indicating that those with low present orientation express
higher expectations of participating in screening. Figure 1(b) does not indicate such
Table 1 Associations between expectations of participation in screening, social deprivation and present
orientation (Spearman’s rho correlation)
Present orientation Future orientation Expectations of diabetes screening
Social deprivation
a .245*** .067 .218***
Present orientation .301*** .265***
Future orientation .054
*** P < 0.001
a most deprived scored as 0, intermediate group scored as 1, least deprived group scored as 2
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Fig. 1 Expectations of participation in screening and (a) social deprivation, (b) present orientation, High
and low present orientation calculated by means of a mean split
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the impact of social deprivation and expectations of participation in screening.
Additional analyses using another part of the data set presented here indicate
present orientation explains part of the association between social deprivation and
uptake (Crockett et al. in submission).
Summary
The results of this study suggest that present orientation is associated with both
social deprivation and with uptake of screening, such that present orientation
partially accounts for the relationship between greater social deprivation and lower
expectations of participation in screening. The results indicate that psychological
factors can contribute to an explanatory framework of screening uptake. This
framework suggests that there is an association between social deprivation and
present orientation and that decisions about uptake of screening are inﬂuenced by
the time orientation of those who are invited. This framework further suggests that
making the more immediate possible harms of screening more salient, as would
happen in an informed choice policy, could reduce uptake of screening in those who
are more socially deprived. This framework can be used to identify and evaluate the
possible impact of an informed choice policy in screening.
Evaluation
The Possible Impact of Informed Choices on Inequality
The study results suggest that the implementation of an informed choice policy,
which makes salient the possible immediate harms of participation, might lead to
decreases in uptake of screening among those who are more socially deprived. This
decrease is unlikely to be matched by a similar decrease among those who are less
deprived, not only because they are less present orientated but also because
evidence suggests that those who are more educated, and typically less deprived, are
more aware of the limited beneﬁts of screening programmes [12].
A differential decline in uptake of screening is an issue of particular concern.
Those who are more socially deprived already have poorer health [7, 17] and are
more likely to develop diabetes and its complications [3, 8]. A reduction in
uptake of screening among those who are most deprived might widen the
existing gap in physical health between those who are more and less socially
deprived, running counter to UK government policy of reducing such inequalities
[10, 11]. If an informed choice policy does reduce the rate of screening of the
most deprived, then there appears to be an ethical dilemma. On the one hand,
there can be greater choice but at the ethical cost of increased inequality; on the
other hand, greater inequality can be avoided, but at the ethical cost of less
informed choice. In the rest of this paper, we aim to describe this dilemma more
fully and offer some thoughts about how, in the face of it, an informed choice
might be evaluated.
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think it possible, to evaluate an informed choice policy fully in the space available.
Our discussion is aimed at those who feel an initial ethical pull both toward
reducing inequality and toward informed choice. Among those who feel this pull are
the UK government, whose policies are explicitly designed to try to achieve both.
Thus we do not aim to persuade those libertarians or elitists who oppose taxation-
funded screening programs altogether. Nor do we intend the ethical claims we make
to be applicable in all times and places.
In aiming our discussion at those who are attracted both to equality and choice,
we do not suggest that the nature of these values is at all obvious. Indeed, one of our
major points will be that any evaluation of an informed choice depends on further
speciﬁcation of these values. It might well turn out, as these values are speciﬁed,
that the dilemma between choice and equality is merely apparent and that a decision
between them in the context of screening does not have to be made.
After the ethical characterization of the choice and equality dilemma, we critique
a public health and paternalistic approach to screening that is sceptical about the
value of choice.
Is There a Dilemma?
As mentioned, it appears that there is a dilemma for those who value both choice
and equality if an informed choice policy reduces the rate of screening of the most
deprived without signiﬁcantly reducing the rates for everybody else. It appears that
the health of the most deprived would decline relative to others and thus inequality
of health would increase. Whether there is actually a dilemma depends partly on
what happens to screening rates in practice, but it also partly depends on the
characterization of the ethical values, as we shall now show.
In the ﬁrst place, it is not obvious, even if there are differential impacts on
screening rates, that choice would produce greater inequality of health. While
maximizing informed choices might result in decreased physical health, by
promoting personal autonomy they might increase psychological well-being.
Personal autonomy has been related to two speciﬁc psychological constructs [51]:
perceived control, which has been linked to positive outcomes including coping,
personal adjustment and success or failure in a variety of areas of life [46]; and self-
efﬁcacy, which is the sense of having mastery over the action needed to achieve a
particular end [4]. Self-efﬁcacy is associated with a number of health-related
behaviours including uptake of screening [13, 14, 19, 25]. Those who are more
socially deprived are not only disadvantaged in terms of physical health but
commonly also have lower levels of positive psychological characteristics, such as
self-efﬁcacy, which contribute to an individual’s overall well-being and are related
to the ability to make autonomous choices in a variety of health and life domains
[5].
The point here can be made in two different ways. One is to say that health, as a
philosophical concept, is about more than narrowly deﬁned physical health and that
the psychological beneﬁts of greater choice for the most deprived are gains in health
to them. This leaves it moot whether a reduction in their rates of screening is worse
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inequalities in health. A second way, which avoids the complicated conceptual
debates about what health is, puts the point as one about the determinants of health.
Even on a relatively narrow construal of health as physical health the psychological
gains of choice, such as increased sense of control [51], might improve the physical
health of the most deprived [1], again leaving it moot whether choice increases
inequalities in health.
Even if there is a conﬂict between choice and equality of health, it does not
follow that there is a conﬂict between choice and the value of equality. Again,
whether there is a conﬂict depends on further speciﬁcation of the value. There is a
large debate in political philosophy called the ‘equality of what?’ debate [44].
Fundamentally, however health is characterized and however equality is charac-
terized, health would only be one item in the metric of inequality. Suppose that an
informed choice policy causes the health of the most deprived to be lower than it
would otherwise have been. The policy also causes their choice to go up. Whether
the result is to make them worse off than they would otherwise have been is a
complicated question that depends on the relative value of health and choice.
Possibly the result should be counted as a gain in equality, since it increases the
choice of the most deprived, although possibly not. The point here is that, from the
viewpoint of equality, concentrating on inequalities in health is concentrating on
only part of the picture.
Not only is the evaluation of choice complicated by debates about health and the
metric of equality, it is also complicated by debates over how to understand the
value of equality. It is possible to give only an incomplete and sketchy account of
this here. Consider three views: utilitarianism, prioritarianism, and egalitarianism.
Utilitarianism recommends policies that maximize aggregate welfare [45]. It would
recommend reducing inequalities of health if this would indeed maximize welfare.
Many utilitarians believe that greater equality would maximize welfare [6]. As for
the policy of informed choice, utilitarians would recommend it if it led to greater
welfare than the alternative and oppose it if it reduced welfare. In the next section,
on paternalism, we make some points about the effects of choice on welfare.
Prioritarianism recommends policies that improve the position of the worst off.
Prioritarians disagree among themselves about the extent of the priority that should
be given to the worst off, for instance whether small gains to the worst off outweigh
large gains to everyone else [30, 31]. However prioritarians decide to evaluate gains
to the worst off, there is no necessary connection between their view and favouring
equality. Improving the position of the worst off might reduce inequalities in health,
but it might also increase them [36, 40]. Egalitarians, by contrast, believe that
inequality is in itself bad. For them, there is some value in reducing inequality even
if it is bad for some and good for no one [49]. This is not to say that egalitarians
would, all-things-considered, want greater equality if it produced no gain in
anyone’s welfare. Their attitude to inequalities would depend on the other values
they hold [36].
In the face of this sketch of various positions, it is clear that evaluating any
inequality produced by an informed choice policy requires more detail about those
effects. That inequality increases does not on its own justify opposing the policy.
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is the right metric for measuring people’s positions, but the position of others
improves. Utilitarians and prioritarians should endorse the policy. Egalitarians
might oppose it but also might not, depending on the other values they hold.
Suppose the position of the most deprived goes down and others’ positions improve.
Egalitarians and prioritarians would probably oppose it, although that might depend
on how much the most deprived lose and how much others gain. Utilitarians will
weigh up the gains and losses to see what maximizes welfare.
In this section we have pointed out some of the complexities of evaluating the
policy of informed choice even if we assume some initial ethical commitment to
both choice and equality. In particular, we have shown that the initial statement of
the dilemma between choice and equality is too crude, and that there might be no
dilemma in the end. In describing the complexities we do not want to suggest that a
rationally defensible overall evaluation is impossible, only that it is perhaps more
difﬁcult than one might think. In the next section, we continue the theme of
complexity by pointing to the for a brisk paternalistic public health approach that
says that if choice reduces health it must be bad.
Informed Choice, Public Health, and Paternalism
If an informed choice policy really does reduce the screening rates of the most
deprived—or, indeed, of the general population—then the argument might be made
that the policy is ethically wrong because it would increase morbidity and mortality.
The argument might be put in terms of public health, that the disease burden of
society would increase, or more directly in paternalistic terms, that individuals
would be net worse off for having and making the choice not to be screened, and
that either way, an informed choice should not be implemented. While we cannot
show decisively that this argument is mistaken, this section points to some of the
serious difﬁculties that face it. We should state at the outset that we understand
paternalism in the sense commonly used in political philosophy, where an action is
paternalistic only if it is both motivated by concern for the target’s interests and in
some way bypasses the target’s own decision-making, for instance by coercing the
target or failing to disclose relevant information [54].
Firstly, at the population level any loss of life resulting from an informed choice
policy has to be set alongside the negative impacts of a public health approach to
screening including death as a consequence of that approach. Emphasizing the
beneﬁts of screening results in limited understanding of the harms of screening,
including the possibility of false negatives and in turn this leads to an
overestimation of the reliability of screening results by both the public and health
professionals [38]. This may lead to symptoms of disease being ignored following a
negative screening result, delaying diagnosis and treatment [2, 38].
Essentially the same points can be made if the argument is put instead in
paternalistic terms, that individuals choose against their best interests when they
choose against screening. From the point of view of any given individual facing the
choice of whether to undergo screening, not being screened carries a certain risk of
morbidity and mortality and so does being screened. Given other costs and beneﬁts
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decide to undergo screening while others choose against it. It is likely that in many
cases those who are more deprived would indeed value increased life expectancy
and it would therefore be appropriate to give those from lower socioeconomic
groups information about their higher risk of dying from the disease to inform their
personal evaluation of the beneﬁts and harms of participation. However, it is also
possible that those who are more socially deprived may value increased life
expectancy differently to those who are less socially deprived resulting in a
preference to delay diagnosis for as long as possible, even if, in the long term this
results in a shortened life expectancy [24]. Thus it is much harder than might be
thought to show that those who choose against screening must be acting against
their better interests.
Moreover, as we pointed out in the previous subsection, the value of autonomous
choice can be intertwined with people’s interests in that having choices can have
psychological, and health-promoting, beneﬁts given perceived control and self-
efﬁcacy have been linked to good health [1, 5]. This is a further reason to doubt that
restricting individuals’ informed choice would promote their overall welfare.
The argument from the beneﬁts of screening against informed choice, in either
public health or paternalistic forms, arguably also undervalues autonomy. For many
political philosophers, and people more generally, being able to make choices for
oneself is good in itself. The value of informed choice is not simply in the extent to
which is allows us to choose what is really in our interests. In other dimensions of
life, such a choice of career or partner, many people want to make their own choices
even if they are less good at selecting than some disinterested observer [43]. Perhaps
these reasons to value informed choice carry over to the choice of screening even if
people do sometimes get it wrong.
A persuasive paternalistic argument must show that, given the possibility of an
informed choice, the people would tend to choose against their interests and that this
would justify denying them the choice. We have not shown that no such argument
could be made, but we have tried to show the severity of the difﬁculties that face it.
Conclusions
This paper has shown how psychological research can contribute to assessing the
possible impact of an informed choice policy on screening uptake. It suggests that an
informed choice policy could lead to a decrease in uptake of screening amongst those
who are most socially deprived, resulting in decreases in the physical health of this
group. From a public health perspective any decrease in physical health is a matter of
concern, particularly if that decrease is greater in those who are more socially
deprived. From an informed choice perspective such a decrease in uptake could be
interpretedasindicatingthatpeoplearemakingautonomouschoicesbasednotonlyon
good knowledge, but also in line with their own values. Those who are more socially
deprived are more present orientated. They therefore value actions that have positive
outcomes immediately and thus, once they understand that the beneﬁts of screening
are not immediate, may be less likely to participate in the screening programme.
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health inequality and on choice. This evaluation has not attempted to provide a
deﬁnitive assessment of whether the introduction of an informed choice policy in
screening can be justiﬁed in the light of the likely impact on physical health
inequalities outcomes across the population. Rather, the evaluation has sought to
describe the way in which philosophical approaches to choice and to health
inequality can be used to inform further discussions about choosing an informed
choice approach to screening over a public health approach.
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Appendix 1
There are 2 types of diabetes. The most common type of diabetes is called Type 2
diabetes. People who have this type of diabetes are more likely to develop heart
disease, stroke, eyesight problems, kidney failure, problems with feet and impotence
and their life expectancy is reduced by ten years. The complications of having
diabetes can be prevented by controlling diet, increasing activity and by taking
tablets prescribed by a doctor.
The chance of developing diabetes increases with age. It is possible for someone
to have Type 2 diabetes and not to know it because they show no symptoms and do
not feel unwell. The Department of Health estimates that there are between 600,000
and 800,000 people in this country who do not know that they have diabetes. The
Department of Health is considering offering people a free screening test for
diabetes in the next few years.
The screening test can ﬁnd some but not all of those who have the early stages of
diabetes. Some people ﬁnd that taking part in screening means that they have to
undergo unpleasant and inconvenient procedures. They may also ﬁnd that they start
worrying about diabetes and may have to start taking tablets and changing their
lifestyle. Some people ﬁnd that taking part in screening gives them peace of mind
about their health and they also know that their early diagnosis will prevent
complications and illness.
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